Public Election Funding

Recent Research on Participation and Competition

Kenneth R. Mayer
Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin-Madison
February 13, 2013



Policy

- Options for public funding
 - 1. Full public funding ("clean elections"), now without spending triggers for additional funds (Arizona Free Enterprise PAC)
 - 2. Partial public funding fixed grants
 - 3. Small contribution matching (often in multiples)
 - 4. Tax credits or refunds for small contributions
 - 5. Subsidies for parties
 - 6. Combinations of 2-5
- Requirements vary: qualifying thresholds, grant sizes and caps, spending limits, funding sources




Electoral Effects

- Clean elections programs increase competition, but the effects are small
 - More contested races (effect strongest in Maine)
 - evidence that clean elections increases the number of candidates
 - Smaller incumbency advantage (≈ 2 percentage points)
 - Not much effect on incumbent reelection rates
- Clear evidence that challengers are more like to accept clean elections funds when anticipating a close race
- partial programs have no significant effect



Competition Levels - CT State House Elections Incumbents



Source: author's calculations from Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission data

Participation Effects

- Women are more likely to accept clean elections grants, but clean elections does not increase the number of women who run, or the number who win
- No clear effect on the diversity of candidate pool
- Effects on candidates
 - Participants express high satisfaction
 - Dramatic reductions in time spent fundraising
 - Evidence that this time is replaced with other forms of voter contact



Effects of Matching Funds

- Typical structure:
 - Small contributions are matched
 - NYC: participating candidates receive a 6:1 match of first \$175;
 that contribution gives the candidate \$1,225
 - Total amount of matching funds capped (\$92,400 in NYC for a council candidate), though candidates can raise and spend as much as they like
- Provides incentive to seek small contributions



Diversity of Donor Pool

- Contribution matching has a major effect on fundraising patterns and the composition of donor pool
 - In NYC, participating candidates have 50% more donors,
 - Increases the number of small donors (>\$250) by as much as 62%
 - increases the fraction of total money raised from small donations by up to 74%
 - Effects are strongest for challengers
- Increases the number of donations and amounts contributed from neighborhoods with high minority concentrations
- Malbin et al. (2012): "There can be little doubt that bringing more small donors into the system in New York City equates to a greater diversity in neighborhood experience in the donor pool"



Bibliography

- 1. Francia, Peter L. and Paul S. Herrnson. 2003. "The Impact of Public Funding Laws on Fundraising in State Legislative Elections." *American Politics Research* 31:520-539
- 2. La Raja, Raymond J. 2008. "Candidate Emergence in State Legislative Elections: Does Public Funding Make a Difference?" Prepared for 2008 Temple-IPA State Politics and Policy Conference, Philadelphia PA.
- 3. Malbin, Michael J., Peter W. Brusoe, and Brendan Glavin. 2012. "Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States." *Election Law Journal* 11:3-20
- 4. Mayer, Kenneth R., Timothy Werner, and Amanda Williams. 2006. "Do Public Funding Programs Enhance Electoral Competition?" In Michael P. McDonald and John Samples, eds., *The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006)
- 5. Miller, Michael. 2008. "Gaming Arizona: Public Money and Shifting Candidate Strategies." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41: 527–32.
- 6. Overton, Spencer. 2012. "Matching Political Contributions." Minnesota Law Review 96:1694-1731.
- Skaggs, Adam, and Fred Wertheimer. 2012. Empowering Small Donors in Federal Elections. Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law
- 8. Werner, Timothy, and Kenneth R. Mayer. 2007. "Public Election Funding, Competition, and Candidate Gender." PS: Political Science and Politics XL:661-667

